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Partners or Strangers? Cooperation, Monetary Trade, 
and the Choice of Scale of Interaction†
By Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, and Marco Casari*
We show that monetary exchange facilitates the transition from small 
to large-scale economic interactions. In an experiment, subjects 
chose to play an “intertemporal cooperation game” either in part-
nerships or in groups of strangers where payoffs could be higher. 
Theoretically, a norm of mutual support is sufficient to maximize 
efficiency through large-scale cooperation. Empirically, absent a 
monetary system, participants were reluctant to interact on a large 
scale; and when they did, efficiency plummeted compared to part-
nerships because cooperation collapsed. This failure was reversed 
only when a stable monetary system endogenously emerged: the 
institution of money mitigated strategic uncertainty problems. 
(JEL C71, C73, E42)
Large-scale cooperation is central to economic development but challenging to achieve (North 1991). The problem is that in large groups individuals are 
strangers, and this limits the ability to reward and punish, which raises vulnerability 
to exploitation and undermines trust (Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990). The 
fundamental question thus is: how can we expand the scale of interaction with-
out undermining trust and cooperation? The literature has focused on studying the 
role of enforcement and punishment institutions (Bidner and Francois 2011; Greif 
2006; Capra et al. 2009; and Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson 2008). Here, we con-
sider a primary financial institution: money. We have designed an experiment to 
uncover whether money can foster an expansion of the scale of interaction and of 
cooperation.
This question is especially relevant given the exponential rise in digital token 
alternatives to traditional currency instruments, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, 
which have generated renewed interest in better understanding of money and the 
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economic problems it ultimately solves (Camera 2017). Identifying a causal link 
between the development of monetary systems and economic expansion is one of 
the open issues because history only provides anecdotal evidence. The advantage of 
the experimental methodology is that we can suppress institutional and environmen-
tal confounding factors that characterize field data, and understand what principles 
are in operation (Plott 2001).
In our experiment, players take part in a sequence of pairwise encounters where 
a good is produced at a cost below its consumption value—hence, there are gains 
from trade. Players face an indefinite sequence of encounters, with roles alternat-
ing between producer and consumer (Townsend 1980). Cooperation amounts to an 
intertemporal exchange of goods and is efficient, as it maximizes long-term payoffs. 
This efficient outcome can be attained through a norm of “mutual support.” We let 
players interact either as partners in fixed pairs, or strangers in large groups where 
counterparts change at random. This distinction is meaningful because large groups 
enjoy a return from cooperation that is 50 percent greater than in partnerships—an 
increase that proxies for gains from specialization and trade in wider markets. A 
drawback of large groups is that strangers cannot establish a reputation.
We contrast a Control condition to a Tokens condition. While in Control, con-
sumers have nothing to offer—so producers can only provide goods on a voluntary 
basis. In Tokens, consumers are endowed with a symbolic object—a token that is 
intrinsically worthless but storable. Here, a monetary trade convention can spon-
taneously emerge if consumers can obtain a good only in exchange for a token. 
By design, nobody is forced to use tokens, so cooperation can still be sustained 
through a norm of mutual support. However, a monetary trade convention can also 
spontaneously emerge if there is a shared belief that production will occur only in 
exchange for a token, in which case tokens will be transferred back and forth among 
players (Camera and Casari 2014).
What sets this study apart from other experiments on money is that the scale of 
interaction is endogenous: players choose between a partnership, or a large group 
of strangers. While, in principle, a norm of mutual support could promote the for-
mation of large cooperative groups in either condition, the data suggest that the 
availability of a monetary system played a key role: in fact, forming a large group 
when a monetary system was unavailable led to efficiency losses. This suggests that 
a causal link exists between the development of a monetary system and the choice 
to form large groups. There is also a positive association between group expansion, 
strength of monetary system, and economic gains.
At the heart of these results lies a tension between higher but riskier payoffs in 
large groups, and smaller but safer payoffs in partnerships. Though the use of tokens 
is not required for the creation of large cooperative groups, it facilitates the expan-
sion of the scale of interaction because it mitigates strategic uncertainty problems and 
reduces the gains from free riding. Strategic uncertainty emerges because the game 
supports multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, and this impairs coordination on efficient 
play (Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990; Capra et al. 2009; and Blonski, Ockenfels, 
and Spagnolo 2011). Adopting a monetary trade convention mitigates this problem 
because it limits the exposure to potential losses compared to a norm of mutual sup-
port. Moreover, such a norm requires a great deal of confidence that others will not 
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succumb to opportunistic temptations as the game progresses—receiving help without 
giving any. This kind of confidence is not easily established in large groups because 
interaction is impersonal and reciprocity impossible (Gächter and Herrmann 2011, 
Fehr and Gächter 2000). Relying on monetary exchange helps in building confidence 
because it imposes significant losses on those who adopt exploitative strategies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides some context by discussing the 
related experimental literature. Section II describes the design. Section III presents 
the theory. Section IV reports the main results, and Section V offers some final 
considerations.
I. Related Experiments
This study is at the intersection of two strands of experimental literature: coopera-
tion in large and small groups, and the study of money (Table 1). The typical finding 
when group size is exogenously manipulated is that cooperation falls as groups get 
larger (see papers in Table 1, top-left cell). By contrast, experiments that endoge-
nously vary the group size report a positive effect on cooperation (Table 1, top-right 
cell). This may be driven by self-selection, as participants can form homogeneous 
groups of cooperators thanks to mechanisms such as “voting with your feet” or 
ostracism.1 Our approach sidesteps this shortcoming by studying endogenous group 
formation without the possibility of self-selection. In our design, subjects choose the 
group size and then are randomly allocated to groups. This enables us to study how 
the institutional environment affects subjects’ ability to support large-scale cooper-
ation when interactions cannot be restricted to homogenous groups of cooperators.
Our paper also contributes to the growing experimental literature on money as a 
means of payment, which started with the early contributions of McCabe (1989), 
Lian and Plott (1998), and Marimon and Sunder (1993). Within this line of research, 
ours is the first study that addresses the fundamental question of endogenizing the 
group size. In previous experiments with money, either the group size is fixed 
(Camera and Casari 2014) or it is exogenously manipulated (Camera, Casari, and 
Bigoni 2013a; Duffy and Puzzello 2014). Results from these earlier studies suggest 
that monetary systems are especially useful in large groups, although the evidence 
is not conclusive.2 The original design that we adopt allows us to measure whether 
the institution of money promotes cooperation on a larger and more efficient scale, 
when  self-selection is impossible.
This paper is part of a broader research agenda about the behavioral importance 
of monetary systems. In particular, it builds on three earlier works where the group 
size is exogenously imposed, and the returns from cooperation are independent of 
group size (Camera and Casari 2014; Camera, Casari, and Bigoni 2013a; and Bigoni, 
Camera, and Casari 2015). The present study contains two elements of novelty: the 
1 In these experiments, the choice of group size is intertwined with the choice of group composition, although 
these are separate issues: one could keep the group size constant, while endogenously altering group composition.
2 Camera, Casari, and Bigoni (2013a) reports that when monetary trade is unavailable cooperation rates decline 
with the size of the group, but remain constant if participants can engage in monetary trade. Duffy and Puzzello 
(2014) reports that the presence of money enables coordination on a more efficient equilibrium, but a replication of 
this result has failed (see Camerer et al. 2016).
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returns from cooperation increase in the scale of interaction, and the group size is 
determined by a collective choice. This allows us to explore the relation between the 
emergence of a monetary system, the expansion of markets, and economic develop-
ment, with a political economy angle.
Here, we lay out the distinct objectives and design of these three closely related 
works, and the additional insights of the present study. Camera and Casari (2014) 
proves that fiat money can endogenously emerge in the lab; it also shows that money 
has functions that go beyond pushing forward the efficiency frontier. This is done by 
adopting a design where—unlike the present study—monetary trade is theoretically 
inefficient. Results indicate that fiat monetary exchange emerges nonetheless, and it 
facilitates a coordination on cooperative play that is hardly attained without money.
The article in Camera, Casari, and Bigoni (2013a) studies cooperation under 
exogenous variation of group size, from 2 to 32 players, with and without tokens. 
The paper finds that without tokens cooperation falls as groups get larger, while 
with tokens it remains stable. Unlike the present study, subjects experienced just 
one group size before being forced into a large group, so they could not assess how 
size affects cooperation. Another fundamental difference with the present study is 
that subjects neither had the option to expand the group size, nor the incentives to 
do so because the returns from cooperation could not increase as groups got larger. 
Here, instead, the transition from partnerships to large groups is endogenous and is 
also theoretically socially efficient. This allows us to study how the emergence of a 
monetary system affects the scale of interaction as well as realized efficiency. The 
theoretical advantage of a monetary strategy over a grim strategy is that it facilitates 
cooperation in large groups by reducing strategic uncertainty. The empirical results 
support this theoretical intuition.
Bigoni, Camera, and Casari (forthcoming) investigates a mechanism that—
according to current thinking in monetary theory (Kocherlakota 1998; Ostroy 
1973)—could possibly explain these earlier results: do tokens act just as carriers of 
information about past conduct? The design thus introduces a treatment character-
ized by a reputational mechanism which, theoretically, should prove superior to a 
monetary system in supporting efficient play. In fact, the experiment does not pro-
vide support for this view because cooperation rates are substantially lower with a 
Table 1—A Map of Related Experimental Literature
Exogenous group size Endogenous group size
No monetary institution
 Camera, Casari, and Bigoni (2013b) Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon (2009)
 Carpenter (2007) Güth et al. (2007)
 Diederich, Goeschl, and Waichman (2016) Maier-Rigaud, Martinsson, and Staffiero (2010)
 Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2004) Nash et al. (2012)
 Isaac and Walker (1988) This study
 Nosenzo, Quercia, and Sefton (2015), etc. (Control condition)
With monetary institution
 Camera, Casari, and Bigoni (2013b) This study
 Duffy and Puzzello (2014) (Tokens condition)
VOL. 11 NO. 2 199BIGONI ET AL.: MONETARY TRADE AND THE SCALE OF INTERACTION
reputation mechanism than with tokens, suggesting that money is not just a carrier 
of information about past conduct.
II. Experimental Design
The experiment has two conditions. We first fully explain the Control condition, 
and then discuss the changes introduced in the Tokens condition.
Control Condition.—In the Control condition, participants play a “helping game” 
in pairs composed of a producer and a consumer. Each producer starts with six con-
sumption units (CUs) and can choose to help (“give help”) or not (“no help”). The 
consumer has three CUs. Helping yields a payoff of 0 CUs to the producer and a 
payoff of  k > 9 CUs to the consumer; the net benefit from help is  k − 9 CUs. The 
value of the parameter  k depends on the size of the economy, as explained below.
Participants play this game repeatedly, in “cycles” of uncertain duration. A cycle 
consists of at least 16 rounds, after which we implement a continuation  probability 
of 75 percent.3 Hence, cycle duration is the same for everyone in the same cycle of 
a session, although it can vary across cycles and sessions. In each round, half of the 
participants are consumers and half producers. Roles are randomly assigned in the 
first round, and deterministically alternate in the following rounds. CUs cumulate 
across rounds and are converted into dollars at the end of the session. This setup cap-
tures the essence of an interaction, in which there are gains from intertemporal trade.
A session includes six cycles. In each cycle, participants interact either in part-
nerships or large groups of 12 or 24 individuals. In a partnership, the counterpart 
is fixed throughout a cycle. In large groups, the counterpart is randomly chosen in 
every round, and identities remain undisclosed; hence, individuals interact as strang-
ers. There is anonymous public monitoring: at the end of each round, participants 
can see whether or not the outcome was identical in every pair of their group (“yes” 
or “no”). Participants can view a record of this feedback—as well as own payoffs, 
roles, actions, and outcomes—for all past rounds of the cycle. Public monitoring 
makes small and large groups more comparable because it ensures that the crucial 
parameter that theoretically supports full cooperation is independent of group size 
(see Section IV). To minimize reputational spillovers, no information is made avail-
able about outcomes outside the participant’s group. We also adopt a perfect stranger 
matching procedure across cycles, ensuring that no one interacts with someone met 
in previous cycles (except possibly in cycle 6).4
Benefits from cooperation are greater in large groups ( k = 18 ) than in partner-
ships ( k = 15 ); see Table 2.
3 A cycle lasted an average of 19 rounds, the longest session lasted 127 rounds. The length of the cycle was not 
preselected in advance. We introduce a discontinuity in continuation probability in round 16 for two reasons. First, 
it provides each subject with a minimum degree of experience, and minimizes the confounding effect of heteroge-
neous duration across cycles and treatments, while keeping cycles’ duration ex ante unknown to participants and 
experimenters alike. Second, it allows us to implement a perfect stranger matching across cycles, which is key to 
avoid reputation spillover effects and to maintain a close connection with the theory. Experimental results appear 
robust to changing the number of initial fixed rounds (Camera, Casari, and Bigoni 2013a).
4 This is feasible because of deterministic alternation of roles. For details about matching across cycles, see the 
online Appendix.
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If no one cooperates, then average per capita payoffs are 4.5 CUs both in part-
nerships and large groups. Instead, under full cooperation, they reach 7.5 CUs in 
partnerships, and 9 CUs in large groups. Hence, by design, the return from coopera-
tion is 50 percent greater in large groups compared to partnerships: full cooperation 
creates a per capita surplus of 3 CUs in partnerships and 4.5 CUs in large groups, 
relative to 4.5 CUs when no one cooperates.5
However, expanding the scale of interaction is not necessarily beneficial, because 
surplus creation depends on the cooperation rate achieved in the group. We assess a 
group’s success in creating surplus by measuring economic efficiency, which is the 
proportion of surplus created by the group in the average round of play, relative to 
the maximum potential of 4.5 CUs. Efficiency is directly proportional to the cooper-
ation rate in the group. It is invariably 0 when no one cooperates; while if everyone 
cooperates, it reaches 67 percent (3 out of 4.5 CUs) in partnerships and 100 percent 
(4.5 out of 4.5 CUs) in large groups.
Each session consists of a Training Phase (cycles 1–4) and a Selection Phase 
(cycles 5–6). Training Phase interaction exogenously alternates across cycles 
between partnerships and groups of 12. To control for order effects, group size in 
the Training Phase followed either the order 2-12-2-12 or 12-2-12-2 (4 sessions 
per order, per treatment). Instead, the scale of interaction in the Selection Phase is 
endogenous. Before the start of cycles 2–5, participants express a preference for 
partnerships or groups of 12; before cycle 6, they choose partnerships or a group of 
24. The majority of choices determines the group size for everyone in the session: 
the choices made before cycles 2–5 were all counted to select the group size for 
cycle 5, while the group size for cycle 6 was determined only by the choices made 
before that cycle.6
5 While the assumption that large markets have higher returns than small markets is uncontroversial, the specific 
wealth multipliers of 1.67 and 2 employed in the experiment are discretionary, although well within the range in 
the experimental literature. Public good experiments typically use multipliers between 1.2 and 2.5, trust games 
generally ranging between 3 and 6. As in any experiment, the quantitative results are of course tied to the exact 
parameter values.
6 The design exhibits an asymmetry in the number of choices expressed for groups of size 2 versus 12 as com-
pared to 2 versus 24. Alternative designs could eliminate this asymmetry but present other drawbacks. For instance, 
subjects could have made just one choice before cycle 5 (12 versus 2) and 1 before cycle 6 (24 versus 2), and no 
choices in previous cycles. Relative to our design, which induces subjects to think more thoroughly about the choice 
over group size, this alternative reduces the focus on the importance of the choice of group size. Another alternative 
is to elicit 2 choices before each cycle 2–4 (1 for 12 versus 2, the other for 24 versus 2), and then to elicit a single 
choice before cycle 5 and before cycle 6. We believe this alternative lowers subjects’ understanding of the task, 
relative to our design, and is more likely to generate noisy choices.
Table 2—Payoffs in Partnerships and Large Groups
Panel A. Partnerships Panel B. Large groups
Producer Producer
Consumer
No help Give help
Consumer
No help Give help
3, 6 15, 0 3, 6 18, 0
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Tokens Condition.—In this condition, we add symbolic, intrinsically worthless 
objects, or “tokens,” which cannot be redeemed for CUs or dollars, and have no 
reference to outside currencies. This expands the strategy space, by introducing the 
possibility of trading help through a direct mechanism (see Table 3).
The supply of tokens is fixed: in round one, every consumer has one token and 
producers have none. This introduces the possibility of fiat monetary exchange. The 
consumer has three alternative actions: carry over the token to the next round (“do 
nothing”), unilaterally “transfer a token,” or “buy help” in exchange for a token. 
The producer can “give help” or not—as in the Control condition—but can also 
“sell help” in exchange for a token. Choices are made simultaneously and without 
communication. Actions had neutral labels: terms like “buy” and “sell” were never 
used in the instructions (for details, see the online Appendix).
The two possible payoff configurations are the same as in the Control condition. 
The payoffs are zero CUs for the producer, and  k CUs for the consumer, when the 
producer helps unconditionally or help is exchanged for a token. Otherwise, the 
payoffs are six CUs for the producer, and three CUs for the consumer. At the end of 
each round, a participant observes the outcome in the pair—whether help was given, 
whether a token was transferred—but not the action of the counterpart. Consider 
that there are multiple combinations of actions that lead to help jointly with the 
transfer of a token (Table 3).
If a consumer has no tokens, he has no actions to take, and the producer can 
only choose whether to help unconditionally or not: hence, the decision situation 
is identical to the Control condition. Token holdings are partially observable by the 
counterpart: in every pair, each player can see if the counterpart has either zero or 
at least one token; the exact number is unobservable in order to preserve anonymity 
and to reduce the cognitive load.
Experimental Procedures.—The experiment involved 384 undergraduate volun-
teers, each of whom participated in only 1 session between September 2014 and 
October 2014. We ran 8 sessions for the Control and 8 for the Tokens condition, 
with 24 participants each. The conversion rate was 1CUs = US$0.20. Sessions 
lasted about 2 hours (including instructions, quiz, and payments) and participants 
were paid on average US$26.73 in cash, privately, at the end of the session. Only 
one randomly selected cycle from the session was paid.
Table 3—The Stage Game in the Tokens Condition
Producer
No help Give help Sell help
Do nothing 3, 6 k, 0 3, 6










Notes: In the experiment  k = 15 in partnerships and  k = 18 in large groups, and actions had 
neutral labels. “ ⊛  → ” indicates the transfer of a token from consumer to producer. 
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The experiment was programmed using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) 
and ran in the Economic Science Institute’s laboratory at Chapman University. No 
eye contact was possible. We collected participants’ demographic data through an 
end-of-session anonymous survey. The experimenter read the instructions and partic-
ipants followed on individual copies. The instructions adopted a neutral language: the 
words “help,” “cooperation,” and “money” were never used (see the online Appendix). 
Before the Training Phase, participants took a quiz with 10 questions testing their 
understanding of the instructions, and received $0.25 for each correct answer.
Design Choices and Possible Alternatives.—Here we provide a few additional 
considerations about the specific design adopted in this experiment, based on results 
from complementary studies within this line of research.
A first consideration is about the choice of information structure. One may argue 
that the Tokens condition adds information about individual past conduct that is 
unavailable in Control; treatment effects may thus be driven by the richer infor-
mation structure and not by the possibility of monetary exchange. This important 
issue is the focus of a companion study (Bigoni, Camera, and Casari 2015). There, 
a third experimental condition introduces a public record of past individual actions 
which, theoretically, should supersede the function performed by tokens. The data 
reveal that cooperation rates in this condition are substantially lower than in Tokens, 
providing evidence that monetary systems perform a richer set of functions than 
just revealing past behaviors. A similar result also emerges in Camera and Casari 
(2018), which shows that information about past conduct alone is ineffective in 
overcoming cooperation challenges in indefinitely repeated games among strangers.
A second consideration concerns the action space in Tokens. One may be concerned 
that the three alternatives available to the subjects in this design may bias the subjects’ 
behavior in favor of the emergence of monetary exchange. Bigoni, Camera, and Casari 
(2015) addresses this possible concern with a design including additional actions that 
are antithetical to monetary exchange. The consumer can give a token only if the pro-
ducer does not help, while the producer can commit to help only if he does not receive 
a token. Hence, tokens may take on a negative connotation as subjects could use them 
to tag defectors. Even under this expanded action set, we observe that subjects learn to 
use tokens as a medium of exchange, neglecting these additional actions.
A third consideration relates to subjects’ experience with monetary systems in their 
daily lives. One may surmise that subjects accustomed to dealing with money outside 
the lab automatically coordinate on using tokens as media of exchange in the experi-
ment. Evidence from earlier studies on the endogenous emergence of monetary sys-
tems does not support this view. In fact, the experimental data reveal that subjects need 
to have repeated exposure to the Tokens condition in order to discover how tokens 
can function as money, so that it takes time for a widespread monetary convention to 
emerge (Camera and Casari 2014; Camera, Casari, and Bigoni 2013b; and Bigoni, 
Camera, and Casari 2015). The four cycles of Training Phase in this design are meant 
to facilitate this process.
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III. Theoretical Considerations
Why should players form large groups? By design, cooperating in large groups is 
more rewarding than in partnerships, so full cooperation in large groups is Pareto-
efficient. In this section, we demonstrate that, according to standard theory, full 
cooperation is an equilibrium in the Control condition both in partnerships and in 
large groups (Section IIIA). This suggests there is no reason to expect higher coop-
eration rates in partnerships than in large groups. In fact, large groups theoretically 
support full cooperation for lower discount factors than partnerships due to the 
higher returns from cooperation and public monitoring. Evidence from previous 
experiments on repeated games among partners suggests that lower threshold dis-
count factors facilitate cooperation (Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011). Therefore, if Pareto 
dominance is a relevant equilibrium selection criterion, subjects should choose large 
groups over partnerships. These considerations suggest a first testable hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 1: Players in the Control condition will select large groups over 
partnerships.
We proceed by showing that a fully cooperative equilibrium exists also in the 
Tokens condition (Section IIIB). This equilibrium can be equivalently sustained 
with and without using tokens as money. In particular, using tokens as money does 
not alter the return from cooperation relative to the Control condition, neither in 
partnerships nor in large groups. These additional considerations suggest a second 
testable hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 2: The availability of tokens will not alter the selection of the scale 
of interaction.
Finally, since each condition supports multiple equilibria, we go beyond the canon-
ical theoretical analysis by studying the impact of strategic uncertainty (Section IIIC). 
We demonstrate that in the Control condition strategic uncertainty may prevent coor-
dination on the efficient equilibrium, but that the use of tokens as money can resolve 
this problem. Based on this refinement to standard theory, we surmise that if strategic 
uncertainty motivates choices, then the use of money might tilt the selection of inter-
action scale toward large groups, in contrast to the hypothesis stated above.
A. Control Condition
Here we show that in our experiment full cooperation can be supported as a sequen-
tial Nash equilibrium in groups of any size. To do so, we consider a “grim” trigger 
strategy specifying actions—for a player who is a producer—based on two “states”: 
(i) Cooperation: the player selects “give help”; (ii) Punishment: the player selects 
“no help.” The strategy specifies that the player starts in the cooperation state and 
 permanently transitions to the punishment state if anyone in the group defects (includ-
ing the player himself). If this strategy is commonly adopted, then it is called a social 
norm. This social norm can support full cooperation in groups of any size thanks to 
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the  availability of anonymous public monitoring (Kandori 1992, Proposition 1). The 
strategy is constructed so that after any history of play, conduct in the continuation 
game is part of an equilibrium of the original game (Abreu, Pierce, and Stacchetti 
1990). The central feature of this norm is that the entire group participates in punish-
ing defections so in equilibrium no one defects. We have the following result.
PROPOSITION 1: If  β ≥  β ∗ ≔  6 ____ 
k − 3, then full cooperation is part of a sequential 
Nash equilibrium, where  β ∗ = 0.4 in large groups and  β ∗ = 0.5 in partnerships.
PROOF: 
See Appendix A. ∎
If participants are risk-neutral, then the fully cooperative equilibrium exists in 
the Control condition, in groups of any size, because in the experiment  β = 0.75 . 
The threshold  β ∗ depends only on the differences in returns from cooperation and 
not on the group size because of public monitoring. Moreover, the derivation of this 
threshold fully takes into account the discontinuity in continuation probability that 
characterizes our design.
The result in Proposition 1 is based on the assumption that all players coordinate 
on a punishment strategy that is immediate, indiscriminate, and unforgiving. However, 
previous experimental results show that trigger strategies of this kind are uncommon 
among partners and even more so among strangers (Camera, Casari, and Bigoni 2012; 
Fudenberg, Rand, and Dreber 2012; and Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011). Furthermore, the 
condition  β ≥  β ∗ does not guarantee that full cooperation will be realized because 
many equilibria exist in the game. For these reasons, below we will refine this standard 
theoretical prediction by incorporating the concept of risk-dominance into the analysis 
(Section IIIC).
B. Tokens Condition
All the equilibria that exist in the Control condition also exist in the Tokens con-
dition, because tokens are intrinsically worthless, do not restrict action sets, and can 
be ignored. In addition, cooperation can be supported as an equilibrium by means 
of monetary trade.
DEFINITION 1 (Monetary Trade Strategy): In any round  t , after any history, if the 
player has no tokens, she has no action to take as a consumer and chooses “sell 
help” as a producer. If the player has some tokens, she chooses “buy help” as a 
consumer and selects “no help” as a producer.
We call monetary trade the outcome that results when everyone adopts the strat-
egy in Definition 1. Here, help is only given quid pro quo in exchange for one token.7 
7 Transferring more than one token is unnecessary to attain full cooperation, and is also impossible in monetary 
equilibrium because each consumer has just one token. These considerations, and a desire to minimize the cognitive 
load for participants, explain why in our design consumers could transfer only one token per round.
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Otherwise, help is not given. In monetary equilibrium, all encounters  support trade 
due to the deterministic alternation between roles, so equilibrium payoffs are iden-
tical to those attained under the social norm. It follows that if the social norm of 
cooperation is an equilibrium, then monetary trade is also an equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 2: If  β ≥  β ∗ =  6 ____ 
k − 3, then the monetary trade strategy in 
Definition 1 supports full cooperation in equilibrium.
PROOF:
See Appendix A. 
To sum up, adding tokens neither precludes the adoption of the social norm of 
cooperation, nor forces the use of tokens. If the discount factor  β supports the fully 
cooperative equilibrium without using tokens, then this is also sufficient to support 
full cooperation by exchanging tokens. Adding tokens simply expands the strategy 
set, but it neither eliminates equilibria, nor expands the set of payoffs compared to 
the Control condition.
C. Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Tokens
Previous experimental results suggest that tokens positively influence outcomes: 
Camera and Casari (2014) reports that tokens facilitated coordination on cooper-
ative play in stable groups of four players; Camera, Casari, and Bigoni (2013b) 
reports that when the group size was exogenously increased, cooperation rates 
declined without tokens, but this no longer occurred when subjects could exchange 
tokens. What is the theoretical mechanism behind these results? In this section, we 
show that the use of tokens reduces the strategic uncertainty that exists in large 
groups. As a consequence, the use of tokens may promote the choice of large groups 
over partnerships.
To study how strategic uncertainty affects the ability to support the efficient 
outcome, we take two steps. First, we demonstrate that in the Control condition 
strategic uncertainty may prevent coordination on the efficient equilibrium in large 
groups (but not in partnerships). Then, we show that the use of tokens as money can 
resolve this problem. The theoretical argument is built along the lines of the study 
in Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo (2011), which adapts the static concept of risk 
dominance to an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in fixed pairs. We study risk 
dominance for the grim strategy and for the monetary trade strategy, by consider-
ing each strategy in isolation against the alternative strategy “always defect.” Our 
focus on comparing two equilibria, instead of three or more, reflects the standard 
approach in the literature. In doing so, we assume that a player who is unsure about 
the strategy choice of others adopts the “principle of insufficient reason,” placing 
equal weight on each strategy choice.
The main result can be summarized as follows.
PROPOSITION 3: The monetary strategy is risk dominant in large groups, while 
the grim strategy is not.
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PROOF: 
See Appendix A. 
Start by noting that, without tokens, strategic uncertainty is not a problem in partner-
ships because there is just one player (the producer) who takes an action in each round. 
In round 1, the action of the producer fully reveals her strategy, “grim” or “always 
defect.” Therefore, the counterpart faces no strategic uncertainty when she becomes a 
producer in round 2. The initial producer can thus select the efficient equilibrium by 
cooperating. This is the central difference between our helping game in fixed pairs and 
the prisoner’s dilemma studied in Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo (2011).
Now consider large groups without tokens. Here there is strategic uncertainty 
because many producers simultaneously choose between “grim” and “always defect” 
in round 1. Grim is risk dominant if initial producers are at least indifferent to choos-
ing the competing strategy. The payoff expected from choosing grim depends only 
on the likelihood that full cooperation is the outcome in round 1, by the end of which 
all strategic uncertainty is resolved: given public monitoring, if there is full cooper-
ation, then this will also be the outcome in every future round, otherwise there will 
be full defection forever after. Consider an initial producer who chooses the grim 
strategy. Suppose she believes that every other initial producer selects grim with 
probability  0 < p < 1 . If there are  n − 1 other producers, then the probability of 
full cooperation in round 1 is  p n−1 , which is decreasing in  n . It follows that, for any 
p , risk-dominance as a strategy selection criterion requires a greater threshold dis-
count factor  β ∗∗ to support cooperation, as compared to the threshold  β ∗ implied by 
standard theoretical arguments. In particular, if we assume that  p = 0.5 as per the 
principle of insufficient reason, then  β ∗∗ ≃ 0.98 for groups of 12, and  β ∗∗ ≃ 0.99 
for groups of 24. As a consequence, the grim strategy is not risk dominant in large 
groups in our design. The message is that strategic uncertainty is likely to impair 
coordination on the efficient equilibrium in the Control condition.
Monetary trade can resolve this problem because it is risk dominant in large 
groups. In the Tokens condition, let the choice be between “monetary trade” and 
“always defect” in round 1. Initial consumers always have an incentive to select 
monetary trade since tokens do not bestow benefits per se. So consider initial produc-
ers. As before, suppose an initial producer believes that every other initial producer 
selects monetary trade with probability  0 < p < 1 . If  p = 0.5 , then  β ∗∗ ≃ 0.63 
for groups of 12, and  β ∗∗ ≃ 0.64 for groups of 24. The reason why the threshold 
discount factor  β ∗∗ needed to support cooperation is not as high as without tokens is 
that mis-coordination on monetary trade does not trigger the permanent and indis-
criminate form of punishment associated with grim. Hence, though strategy mis-
coordination does reduce payoffs of monetary traders, adopting the monetary trade 
strategy can be profitable even if not everyone else does the same.
These considerations suggest that the addition of tokens can be very helpful to 
widen the scale of cooperation, improving payoffs. This, of course, may occur only 
if tokens are used as money in the experiment. In that case, the emergence of a 
monetary system might induce subjects to choose large groups over partnerships in 
the Tokens condition. This contrasts with Hypothesis 2, which is based on standard 
theoretical arguments that do not account for the role of strategic uncertainty.
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IV. Results
We report four main results, which are based on subjects’ behavior in the Selection 
Phase (cycles 5 and 6). Before presenting them, we provide an overview of behavior 
in the Training Phase. To balance the number of observations across cycles and ses-
sions, the analysis focuses on rounds 1–16 of a cycle. The four results reported are 
robust to considering all rounds.
A. Training Phase
Average cooperation rates were higher in partnerships than in large groups (69.4 
percent versus 50.0 percent, p-value = 0.016 in Control; 67.6 percent versus 48.8 
percent, p-value = 0.023 in Tokens; see also the regression in Table 4, Model 1).8 
However, in the Training Phase, partnerships did not create more surplus than large 
groups because, by design, they had lower returns from cooperation (efficiency was 
46.2 percent versus 50.0 percent in Control, and 46.1 percent versus 48.8 percent 
in Tokens; p-value  > 0.1 under both conditions; see, also, Table 4). Given this evi-
dence, there is no clear social benefit from enlarging the scale of interaction, and 
hence no reason to expect that a majority of participants would express a preference 
for large groups in either condition.
A second important consideration is that a monetary trade convention emerged 
in the experiment, but its development required some time and experience. In the 
Training Phase, holding group size constant, aggregate cooperation rates, and effi-
ciency were similar in Control and Tokens; this evidence is provided by the first 
three coefficients in the regressions in Table 4.9 However, there were important 
differences in individual actions across Conditions. In Tokens, whenever mone-
tary trade was feasible (i.e., the consumer had at least 1 token), consumers over-
whelmingly chose “buy help” (81.8 percent) and producers mostly chose “sell 
help” (63.4 percent). Instead, help was rarely given to consumers without tokens 
(18.3 percent); this contrasts with behavior observed under the same decisional 
situation in Control, where “give help” was the predominant choice (59.7 per-
cent). Simply put, in Tokens, producers were reluctant to help without being 
concurrently compensated with a token. These results are in line with previous 
experiments (Camera, Casari, and Bigoni 2013b; Bigoni, Camera, and Casari 
2015), thus providing a reassuring replication of earlier results obtained under 
different experimental protocols, payoffs, and continuation probability (Camerer 
et al. 2016).
In what follows, we report how these differences in Training Phase behavior 
across conditions influenced participants’ desire to widen the scale of interaction in 
the Selection Phase.
8 p-values presented in this paragraph are based on two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests with 
exact statistics, taking 2 (matched) observations per session: N 1 = N 2 = 8.
9 In addition, for each group size, we obtain a p-value  > 0.1 for both cooperation rate and efficiency, based 
on two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney rank sum tests with exact statistics, taking 1 observation per session with 
 N 1 =  N 2 = 8 .
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B. The Choice of Scale of Interaction
The experimental evidence does not support either of the theoretical hypotheses 
about the endogenous scale of interaction, while it is in line with the competing, 
behavioral hypotheses.
RESULT 1: Without tokens, participants infrequently form large groups.
RESULT 2: The availability of tokens promotes the formation of large groups.
Participants in Tokens selected to interact in large groups more frequently than in 
Control (Table 5).
By the end of the Training Phase, all subjects have experienced two cycles of inter-
actions in two different partnerships and in two different groups of 12. Therefore, to 
analyze preferences for large and small groups, we focus on the choices expressed 
in the Selection Phase, comprising cycles 5 and 6. Overall, the share of preferences 
for large groups is 55.8 percent in Tokens and 39.3 percent in Control; the difference 
is statistically significant according to a two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test 
( p-value = 0.030,  N 1 =  N 2 = 8 ) and to the regression in Table 6 ( p-value 0.014 
on “Tokens condition” coefficient).
The result is robust to separately considering cycle 5 and cycle 6 according to 2 
regressions based on the same specification as the regression in Table 6 (the coeffi-
cients on the Tokens dummy are significant at the 5 percent level, in both cycle 5 and 
6). However, according to two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney tests run  separately 
Table 4—How Money and Group Size Influence Efficiency
Model 1 Model 2
Dep. var. = cooperation Dep. var. = efficiency
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Control × large −0.194 (0.040) 0.037 (0.035)
Tokens × partnership −0.018 (0.040) −0.012 (0.035)
Tokens × large −0.206 (0.040) 0.025 (0.035)
Cycle 2 0.180 (0.040) 0.155 (0.035)
Cycle 3 0.212 (0.040) 0.167 (0.035)
Cycle 4 0.275 (0.040) 0.230 (0.035)
Constant 0.527 (0.037) 0.325 (0.033)
Observations 64 64
R2 0.633 0.463
Notes: One observation is the per round average cooperation or efficiency in each cycle of 
a session. Training Phase only (cycles 1–4). The default condition is Control and partner-
ships. Linear regressions are on a set of regressors that include the interaction between the 
Condition and group size. Data is from rounds 1–16 only. Except for constant, all regres-
sors are dummy variables. The difference between coefficients for Tokens  × partnership and 
Tokens  × large is statistically significant in Model 1 (two-sided Wald test, p-value  < 0.001), 
but not in Model 2 (two-sided Wald test, p-value  = 0.289). The difference between coefficients 
for Tokens  × large and Control  × large is statistically insignificant in Model 1 (two-sided 
Wald test, p-value = 0.770), and in Model 2 (two-sided Wald test, p-value  = 0.739). The dif-
ference between coefficients for cycle 2 and cycle 4 is statistically significant in Models 1 and 
2 (two-sided Wald test, p-values  = 0.020 and 0.037, respectively).
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for cycle 5 and 6, the treatment effect is significant only for cycle 6 ( p-values 
= 0.109 and 0.065, respectively, for cycle 5 and cycle 6).
Next we analyze the choice of group size and investigate the determinants of 
these choices. Is it monetary exchange that induced a preference for large groups, or 
the experience of higher cooperation levels? We can exclude differences in coopera-
tion rates as the main explanation: as noted above, in the Training Phase cooperation 
levels were not statistically different between Tokens and Control. Therefore it must 
be the exposure to monetary exchange itself that induced different choices over 
group size. In what follows, we investigate how.
Two elements of the experience during the Training Phase determined an individ-
ual’s disposition to widen the scale of interaction: experiences of full cooperation 
(the subject always receives help as a consumer, and always gives help as a pro-
ducer) and exploitation by free riders (the subject gives more help than he receives). 
Below we quantify these two elements, and we explain how they affect the individ-
ual’s choice of group size in the Selection Phase.
We measure exploitation in the Training Phase by the endogenous variable help 
imbalance, calculated as the difference between how frequently a participant received 
and gave help in a cycle, normalized for the number of rounds. Figure 1 shows that 
help imbalance goes from −1 to 1: it is negative for someone who gave help more 
frequently than she received it, positive otherwise. In particular, help imbalance 
takes value −1 for an unconditional cooperator who always gave help as a producer, 
but never received help as a consumer; this corresponds to an average payoff of 1.5 
Table 5— Share of Preferences for Large Groups
Control Tokens
Overall (cycles 2–6) 0.421 0.546
Selection phase only
 Cycle 5 (groups of 12) 0.432 0.573
  Large groups formed in 2 of 8 sessions 6 of 8 sessions
 Cycle 6 (groups of 24) 0.354 0.542
  Large groups formed in 1 of 8 sessions 4 of 8 sessions
Table 6—How Money Affects Preferences for Large Groups
Dependent variable: Preference for large groups (yes = 1) Marginal effect SE
Tokens condition (dummy) 0.177 (0.072)
Cycle 6 (dummy) −0.055 (0.034)
Controls Yes
Observations 768
Notes: One observation per person per cycle. Data is for Selection Phase only (cycles 5 and 
6). Panel probit regression on the preferences for large groups, with standard errors robust for 
clustering at the session level. The regression includes controls for order effects in the Training 
Phase, sex, and for the number of right answers and the response time in a comprehension test 
on the experimental instructions. Marginal effects are computed at the mean of the value of 
regressors (at zero for dummy variables).
210 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS MAY 2019
CUs per round. Conversely, a free rider who never helped as a producer, but always 
received help as a consumer, has an imbalance of 1; this corresponds to an average 
payoff of 3 +  k/2 CUs per round. The help imbalance is 0 for someone who gave 
and received help in equal amounts, over the course of a cycle; this occurs when 
the participant experienced full cooperation (denoted by the dark bars in Figure 1), 
partial but proportionate cooperation (e.g., the participant helped 3 out of 8 times as 
a producer, and received help 3 out of 8 times as a consumer), or no cooperation at 
all. As a result, the average payoff associated with 0 help imbalance ranges between 
1.5 +  k/2 (full cooperation) and 4.5 (no cooperation) CUs per round.
Participants are unsure which strategy others will use. This strategic uncer-
tainty (Van Huyck,  Battalio, and Beil 1990; Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels 
2009) implies that those who help in order to establish a cooperative norm 
may not receive help in future rounds. This exploitation hazard is captured 
by the dispersion of help imbalance across participants; Figure 1 reveals 
that it was greater in large groups than partnerships. A zero imbalance was 
more frequently attained in partnerships than large groups: in Control, we 
have 0.563 versus 0.156, respectively; in Tokens, we have 0.609 versus 0.299 
( p-value  = 0.008 in each treatment—two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
rank tests with exact statistics, 2 matched observations per session: N 1 = N 2 = 8); 
additional evidence is provided by the “Large groups” coefficient in Table B1, in the 
online Appendix.
A widespread adoption of monetary exchange offers protection against exploita-
tion hazards because a participant must transfer a token to receive help, and the 
only way to obtain tokens is to help others. There is evidence that the possibility to 
trade tokens for help quid pro quo reduced this exploitation hazard in the experi-
ment. We more frequently observe 0 help imbalance in Tokens than in Control, espe-
cially in large groups where it was almost twice as frequent (0.299 versus 0.156, 
p-value  = 0.0026—two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney rank sum test with exact sta-
tistics, 1 observation per session: N 1 = N 2 = 8); Table B2 in the online Appendix 
provides further evidence.
Were the more cooperative type of participants more likely to choose a large 
group? The probit regression in Table 7 estimates how the desire to widen the scale 
of interaction is affected by various factors in the Selection Phase, when participants 
had already experienced small and large groups. The dependent variable takes value 
1 when a participant expressed a preference for large groups of 12 and 24 (cycles 5 
and 6, respectively) and 0 otherwise.
This regression reveals that free riders, i.e., those who received more help than 
they gave, were more willing to interact in large groups. Instead, those exploited by 
free riders were more likely to opt for the safety experienced in partnerships. This 
may seem surprising but consider, first, that participants could not self-select into 
homogenous groups of cooperators, and, second, that in large groups free riders 
could not be directly targeted for punishment.
Support for these findings comes from the estimated coefficients on help imbal-
ance experienced during the Training Phase in partnerships and groups of strang-
ers, and full cooperation in partnerships. The regression reveals that help imbalance 
in large groups is crucial. The share of free riders was similar across conditions 
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Figure 1. The Distribution of Help Imbalance
Notes: Help imbalance is the difference between how frequently a participant gave and received help in a cycle, 
normalized for the number of rounds. Unconditional cooperators who always gave help as producers, and never 
received help as consumers, have an imbalance of −1; conversely, free riders who never helped as producers, and 
always received help as consumers, have an imbalance of 1. An imbalance of zero indicates the participant gave 
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Table 7—Money Promotes the Formation of Large Groups
Dependent variable: Individual preference for large groups (0 = partnerships) Marginal effect SE
Tokens condition × cycle 5 (dummy) 0.115 (0.075)
Tokens condition × cycle 6 (dummy) 0.156 (0.080)
Cycle 6 (dummy) −0.087 (0.052)
Training phase
Help imbalance—partnerships 0.135 (0.146)
Help imbalance—large groups 0.312 (0.072)
Full cooperation—partnerships (dummy) −0.183 (0.062)
Controls Yes
Observations 768
Notes: One observation per person per cycle. Panel probit regressions on preferences for large groups of 12 and 24 
expressed in the Selection Phase (cycles 5 and 6, respectively), with standard errors robust for clustering at the ses-
sion level. The regression includes controls for order effects in the Training Phase, sex, the number of right answers, 
and response time in a comprehension test on the instructions. Marginal effects are computed at the regressors’ 
mean value (at zero for dummy variables). Data from rounds 1–16 only. 
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(37.0 percent versus 37.2 percent, Figure 1), but more participants were exploited in 
Control than in Tokens (47.4 percent versus 32.8 percent, Figure 1). This suggests 
that the different experience of exploitation weakened the desire to expand the scale 
of interaction in Control.
Large groups never attained full cooperation, while several partnerships attained 
it (37.0 percent in Tokens and 47.4 percent in Control, Figure 1). Those who were 
in a cooperative partnership were less willing to widen the scale of interaction than 
those in other partnerships (the regressor “Full cooperation” in Table 7 is nega-
tive and highly significant). Partners attained full cooperation more frequently in 
Control than in Tokens (the difference, however, is not significant according to a 
two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test, and marginally significant according to the 
regression in Table B3 in the online Appendix), which suggests that the possibility 
of relying on monetary trade displaced norms of voluntary help (Camera, Casari, 
and Bigoni 2013b).10 This is a second reason behind the weaker desire to expand the 
scale of interaction observed in Control compared to Tokens.
The “Tokens condition” dummies in Table 7 capture the residual difference 
across conditions in participants’ willingness to widen the scale of interaction. The 
estimated coefficient is positive and significant only for cycle 6, when groups of 24 
could be formed, but not for cycle 5, where the size of large groups was 12, as in the 
Training Phase. A reason may be that participants never experienced interaction in 
groups of 24 before. In this case, the presence of tokens made a difference because 
participants realized that monetary trade reduced strategic uncertainty. That is why 
participants in Tokens condition were more willing to select large groups.
C. Efficiency
Recall that, by design, cooperative large groups create 50 percent more surplus 
than cooperative partnerships, thus raising efficiency from 67 percent to 100 percent. 
But uncooperative large groups may also destroy surplus relative to partnerships. 
Maximum efficiency could be attained in any condition by simply taking turns at 
helping others—it did not require the exchange of tokens. By contrast, experimental 
data reveal different patterns across conditions.
RESULT 3: Without tokens, endogenously formed groups achieved lower effi-
ciency than partnerships. The converse held true with tokens.
In the experiment, wide disparities emerged between Tokens and Control in the 
Selection Phase—when the group size was endogenous. In Control, efficiency fell 
when participants chose to widen the scale of interaction. In Tokens, the opposite 
held true.
10 In Tokens, there is more than one way to support full cooperation—monetary exchange or the trigger strat-
egy—which may give rise to coordination issues. Among partners, a single round of miscoordination would prevent 
monetary exchange, if it leaves the consumer without tokens. This can explain why full cooperation in Control was 
initially more frequent than in Tokens. Subjects did converge on a norm of monetary exchange in Tokens, but only 
with experience: in cycle 4, the frequency of full cooperation in partnerships was similar in Control and Tokens, 
62.5 percent versus 60.4 percent.
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The linear regression in Table 8 measures how efficiency varies with group size 
and availability of tokens. The dependent variable is realized efficiency in a cycle,  in 
a session. In Tokens, large groups attained significantly greater efficiency than part-
nerships (67.2 percent versus 55.4 percent, two-sided Wald test on the estimated coef-
ficients, p-value = 0.059). The opposite is true in Control (45.0 percent versus 57.3 
percent, p-value = 0.049). Large groups also attained greater efficiency in Tokens 
than Control (two-sided Wald test on the estimated coefficients, p-value = 0.016). 
In partnerships, instead, efficiency levels were similar across conditions.
RESULT 4: Strong monetary systems raised efficiency in large groups compared to 
partnerships. Weak monetary systems reduced it.
As efficiency is proportional to cooperation rates, it is interesting to see how 
cooperation rates differed across conditions in the Selection Phase. When we pool 
together data for cycles 5 and 6, we find that average cooperation rates in large 
groups were 67.6 percent in Tokens versus 47.2 percent in Control. As a compari-
son, cooperation rates in partnerships were quite similar, with 83.1 percent in Tokens 
versus 86.0 percent in Control.
To assess the significance of these differences, consider the regression in Table 9, 
based on the specification in Table 8. Partnership’s cooperation rates are statisti-
cally similar across conditions. In each condition, cooperation rates fall as we move 
from Partnerships to Large groups. However, the decline is significantly larger in 
Control as compared to Tokens; the Control condition  × Large and Tokens condition 
 × Large coefficients are both negative, but are significantly different at the 5 percent 
level (Wald test, p-value = 0.019).
The distribution of efficiency across large groups gives us an additional measure 
of how monetary trade affected economic performance. In the Tokens condition, 16 
large groups were formed in the Selection Phase; half of these groups exceeded the 
67 percent efficiency threshold of partnerships (Figure 2). Instead, in the Control 
condition, this happened only in one of the five large groups that were formed (a 
group of size  N = 12 ).
Table 8—How Monetary Trade and Group Size Influence Efficiency
Dependent variable: Efficiency Coefficient SE
Control condition × large −0.121 (0.056)
Tokens condition × partnership −0.021 (0.030)
Tokens condition × large 0.101 (0.064)




Notes: One observation is the average efficiency in a cycle of a session, Selection Phase only 
(cycles 5 and 6). The default condition is Control, partnerships. Linear regression on real-
ized efficiency on a set of dummy variables that include the interaction between condition 
and group size. Standard errors are robust for clustering at the session level. Data from rounds 
1–16. 
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Tokens are intrinsically worthless, so their availability did not raise efficiency 
per se. Tokens merely offered participants an additional way to support cooperation 
among strangers. In fact, efficiency systematically improved with the intensity of 
monetary trade (Figure 2). Those groups that established a solid convention of trade 
attained efficiency above partnerships, while those where the convention of mone-
tary trade failed to take hold attained efficiency below that of the average partner-
ship. This positive relation holds for the Training and Selection Phases.
Linear regressions on average payoff per round attained by participants in large 
groups (Selection Phase) show a positive and significant effect of the intensity of 
monetary trade at the group and at the individual level (Table 10). The dependent 
variable is the average payoff per round for a participant in a large group (0, 1, or 
2 observations per participant). The regressors include two variables related to the 
intensity of monetary trade: at the group and individual level.11
V. Conclusions
We have shown that well-functioning monetary institutions can cause a group of 
people to transition from engaging in low-value personal exchanges in partnerships 
to pursue high-return impersonal exchange in large groups. We also investigated, 
theoretically and empirically, the mechanism that enables this transition.
In an experiment where participants could rely on the institution of money, large 
groups spontaneously emerged, cooperated more, and created more surplus than 
partnerships. In contrast, large groups rarely emerged without a monetary institution 
and, when they did, free riding prevailed because defectors could not be identified. 
In each treatment, the decision to form large groups involved every session par-
ticipant, and it did not hinge on self-selection effects because defectors could not 
be excluded from the group. This setup differs from the typical experiments about 
11 The intensity of monetary trade at the group level is measured as the overall frequency of the actions “sell 
help” and “buy help”; at the individual level, it is measured as the frequency of the actions “sell help” and “buy 
help” in all rounds in which monetary trade was feasible.
Table 9—Cooperation in the Selection Phase
Dependent variable = cooperation Coefficient SE
Control condition × large −0.404 (0.063)
Tokens condition × partnership −0.033 (0.045)
Tokens condition × large −0.183 (0.068)




Notes: One observation is the average cooperation in each cycle of a session. Selection Phase 
only (cycles 5 and 6). The default condition is Control, partnerships. Linear regression on 
average cooperation on a set of dummy variables that include the interaction between condi-
tion and group size. Standard errors are robust for clustering at the session level. Data from 
rounds 1–16.
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endogenous group formation, where inclusion or exclusion rules for single individ-
uals make self-selection possible.
So, why did a monetary institution promote large-scale cooperation? Simply put, 
it offered protection from strategic uncertainty. Strategic uncertainty becomes a cen-
tral stumbling block to widening the scale of cooperation when self-selection mech-
anisms are unavailable. Consider that our experimental setup exhibits equilibrium 
multiplicity ranging from zero to full cooperation. Partners can easily coordinate 
on a high-payoff strategy by relying on reciprocity and reputation. Instead, in large 
groups, opportunistic temptations are stronger because free riders cannot be directly 
targeted for punishment. This contributes to raising strategic uncertainty as partici-
pants are unsure about what others will choose. Selecting a scale of interaction thus 
hinges on the perceived trade-off between a partnership’s low but predictable pay-
off, and the possibly higher but unpredictable payoff of large groups.
Were cooperative types of participants more likely to choose large groups? The 
answer is no: preferences for large groups were especially strong among free riders, 
and were especially weak among cooperators who were their victims. This finding 
is perhaps surprising vis-à-vis the extant literature, where the driving force behind 
endogenous group formation is self-selection. For example, if subjects can “vote with 
their feet,” then they can congregate into homogenous cooperative groups. Under 
our design with random allocation of participants to large groups, the  mechanism at 
Figure 2. A Strong Monetary System Raised Efficiency in Large Groups
Notes: One observation per group, per cycle. The intensity of monetary trade is the overall frequency of the actions 
“sell help” and “buy help.” Minimum efficiency (0 percent) is obtained when help is never given. Maximum effi-
ciency in fixed pairs is 67 percent, which is obtained when help is always given; in large groups it is 100 percent. 
Realized efficiency in partnerships (41.7 percent) is computed aggregating data from the Training and Selection 
Phases (dashed line). Data from rounds 1–16, Tokens condition only.
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work is completely different. In this manner, we uniquely contribute to the literature 
about endogenous group formation by studying an empirically relevant mechanism 
for collective choice that is not based on segregation.
These considerations explain why a monetary trade convention was so effec-
tive in supporting the transition to large-scale interaction. Money prevents free 
riders from exploiting cooperators: producers help only in exchange for a token, 
and only consumers who helped in the past have a token. Hence, money makes 
cooperators less reluctant to venture into groups of strangers. The experimental 
data offer strong evidence about this mechanism. A unique result is that only those 
experimental societies that were able to establish a strong convention of monetary 
trade managed to transition to a large and successful group. In fact, we find that 
poorly functioning monetary institutions proved to be a liability to large groups, 
lowering payoffs below those achieved in partnerships, and even if partnerships 
were designed to be less efficient.
These findings provide novel insights into the role played by monetary systems 
within the architecture of modern economic systems. They also bring forth new 
questions. For example, would subjects in an experiment collectively decide to 
adopt a monetary system, if given the choice? We also need to better understand 
how monetary systems would interact with self-selection mechanisms: would we 
observe the emergence of separate groups, some using money and others relying on 
non-monetary institutions? We leave these questions to future research.
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Define a generic meeting in round  t by { i,  o i (t)} , where  i is a player and  o i (t) is the 
other player in the pair. To support full cooperation as a sequential Nash equilibrium 
Table 10—Intense Monetary Trade Raises Payoffs in Large Groups
Dependent variable: Average per round profit Coefficient SE
Intensity of monetary trade
 at the group level 3.419 (0.203)
 at the individual level 0.919 (0.215)







Notes: One observation per person per cycle. Selection Phase only (cycles 5 and 6). Out of 
16 possible opportunities to form large groups, 10 were realized (see Table 5 in the online 
Appendix). Panel regression on data for large groups in the Selection Phase, Tokens condi-
tion. The dependent variable is the average payoff per round for a participant in a large group. 
Among the regressors, we include a dummy taking value 1 for cycle 6. The regression includes 
controls for order effects in the Training Phase, sex, the number of right answers, and response 
time in a comprehension test on the instructions. Standard errors are robust for clustering at 
the session level.
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outcome, we consider a trigger strategy described by an automaton with two states, 
I and II.
DEFINITION 1 (Cooperative Strategy): At the start of any round  t , player  i can be 
in state I or II, and takes actions only as a producer. As a producer, player  i selects 
“give help” in state I, and “no help” in state II. In  t = 1 , the state is I; in all  t ≥ 1 ,
 (i) if player  i is in state I, then  i moves to state II in  t + 1 only if some producer 
in the group—not necessarily the producer in  {i,  o i (t) } —chooses “no help.” 
Otherwise, player  i remains in state I;
 (ii) there is no exit from state II.
Let the payoff matrix in the stage game be defined below.
Producer
No help Give help
Consumer  d − l, d  k, 0 
In the experiment  d = 6 ,  l = 3 , and  k = 15 in partnerships and  18 in large 
groups. In order to prove Proposition 1, we show that, if  β ≥  β ∗ =  d _______ 
k − d + l, 
then the strategy in Definition 1 supports full cooperation in equilibrium.
The proof is constructed by means of two lemmas. We start by calculating equi-
librium payoffs. Recall that players deterministically alternate between the two 
roles of producer and consumer. Hence, in equilibrium, players earn  k every other 
round. Discounting starts on date  T , when the random termination rule starts; hence, 
only payoffs from rounds  t = T + 1 (included) are discounted at rate  β . Let  v s (t) 
denote the equilibrium payoff at the start of  t = 1, 2, … to a player who is in role 
 s = 0, 1 , where  0 = producer and  1 = consumer.
LEMMA 1: Fix  T ≥ 1 and  β ∈  (0, 1) . In the cooperative equilibrium, we have 
 v 1 (t) >  v 0 (t) for all  t = 1, 2, …  , where for  h = 1, 2, …  ,







k ×  T − t _
2
 + v s 
 
if  T − t = 2h
   k ×  T − t + 1 _
2
 + βv s  if  T − t = 2h − 1,  
v s 
 
if  T − t ≤ 0
 
and
  v s ≔  
 β 1−s 
 _ 
1 −  β 2 
× k  for s = 0, 1. 
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PROOF OF LEMMA 1: 
To prove the result, we consider the two cases  t ≥ T and  t < T separately.
Let  v s denote the equilibrium payoff at the start of round  t ≥ T to a player who 
is in role  s = 0, 1 (0 identifies a producer). It holds that
  v s ≔  
 β 1−s 
 _ 
1 −  β 2 
× k  for s = 0, 1. 
The payoff is time invariant due to the stationary alternation between roles.
Now consider round  t < T . Given the proposed strategy, those who are initial 
consumers earn  k on odd dates ( t = 1, 3, …  ) and 0 otherwise; initial producers 
earn  k on even dates ( t = 2, 4, …  ) and 0 otherwise. Hence, knowing if  T − t is odd 
or even matters. For  j, h = 1, 2, …  and  s = 0, 1 it holds that
  v s (t) =  {
 
k ×  T − t ____2 + v s  
if T − t = 2h
   
k ×  T − t + 1 _______2 + βv s 
 
if T − t = 2h − 1
 . 
The continuation payoff  v s (t) has two components. The first sums up the round 
payoffs for all  t ≤ T − 1 . The second sums up the round payoffs for all  t ≥ T . It 
should be clear that  v s (t) is increasing in  T for  s = 0, 1 and it achieves a minimum 
when  T − t = 1 . Hence, the equilibrium payoff to a player in role  s = 0, 1 on any 
date  t ≥ 1 is given by (1). We have  v 1 (t) >  v 0 (t) for all  t because  v 1 >  v 0 for all 
β ∈  (0, 1) . ∎
The equilibrium payoff is found by substituting  t = 1 in expression (1). To 
determine the optimality of the cooperative strategy we must check two items: in 
equilibrium no producer has an incentive to defect; out of equilibrium no producer 
has an incentive to cooperate. We let  v ˆs (t) denote the continuation payoff to a player 
in role  s on date  t , off equilibrium.
Consider a generic producer in a round  t ≥ 1 . In equilibrium, choosing “give 
help” is a best response if
(2)  v 0 (t) ≥  v ˆ0 (t) . 
The left-hand side of the inequality denotes the payoff to a producer who cooperates 
in the round, choosing “give help.” The right-hand side denotes the continuation 
payoff on date  t if the producer defects in equilibrium (reverting back to playing 
the social norm in the next round), given that off-equilibrium everyone follows the 
group punishment rule prescribed by the social norm. Hence, if a defection occurs 
on  t , then every producer selects “no help” from  t + 1 because equilibrium defec-
tions are public.
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It should be clear that
  v ˆ0 (t) =  v ˆ0 ≔  
d + β (d − l) 
  ___________
1 −  β 2 
  if t ≥ T. 
For  h = 1, 2,  …  , the continuation payoff off-equilibrium satisfies







(d + d − l) ×  T − t _
2
 +  v ˆ  0 
 
if T − t = 2h
    (d + d − l) ×  T − t + 1_ 
2
 + β v ˆ  0  if T − t = 2h − 1. 
 v ˆ  0 
 
if T − t ≤ 0
 
Off-equilibrium payoffs are independent of the size of the group  N since produc-
ers defect forever after seeing a defection.
LEMMA 2: Fix  T ≥ 1 and  β ∈  (0, 1) . If  β ≥  β ∗ ≔  d _ k − d + l , then 
 v 0 (t) ≥  v ˆ0 (t) for all  t ≥ 1 .
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
The result is obtained by manipulation of the equations in (3). Note that
  v 0 −  v ˆ0 =  
β
 _ 
1 −  β 2 
× k −  
d + β (d − l) 
  ___________
1 −  β 2 
 =  β _ 
1 −  β 2 
×  (k − 2d + l) −  d _ 1 + β .
Now define
   Δ 0 (t) =  v 0 (t) −  v ˆ0 (t) 







(k − 2d + l) ×  T − t _
2
 + v 0 −  v ˆ  0 
 
if T − t = 2h
     (k − 2d + l) ×  T − t + 1 _
2
 + β(v  0 −  v ˆ  0 ) if T − t = 2h − 1. 
v 0 −  v ˆ  0 
 
if T − t ≤ 0
 
It is immediate that  Δ 0 (t = T − 2h) >  Δ 0 (t ≥ T) ; note that  k − 2d + l > 0 by 
assumption. Also,  Δ 0 (t = T − 2h + 1) >  Δ 0 (t ≥ T) ; to prove it insert  h = 1 
(the most stringent case), rearrange the inequality, and then insert the expression for 
v 0 −  v ˆ0 , to obtain the inequality  k − 2d + l > − d .
Given that the minimum value of  Δ 0 (t) is achieved for  T − t ≤ 0 , then (2) holds 
for all  t whenever
  0 ≤  v 0 −  v ˆ0 =  
β
 _ 
1 −  β 2 
×  (k − 2d + l) −  d _ 1 + β
 ⇔ β ≥  β ∗ ≔  d _ 
k − d + l . 
Note that  β ∗ < 1 because  k − 2d + l > 0 by assumption. ∎
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Given that everyone else adopts the strategy in Definition 1, it is always individu-
ally optimal to punish out of equilibrium, because “no help” is the dominant action 
when everyone forever defects.
Note that  v ˆs (1) is the payoff associated to infinite repetition of the static Nash 
equilibrium (every producer chooses “no help”), which is always an equilibrium of 
the repeated game. The condition  β ≥  β ∗ is therefore necessary and sufficient for 
existence of a cooperative equilibrium because it ensures that players earn payoffs 
above those guaranteed by defecting in any round. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Conjecture that monetary trade is an equilibrium. Consider a player with  s = 0, 1 
tokens at the start of a round. In equilibrium, a consumer has a token and a producer 
has none. Hence, the probability that a consumer with a token meets a producer 
without tokens is 1. Denote by  v s (t) the equilibrium continuation payoff. Because 
the consumption pattern is the same as under the social norm, in monetary equilib-
rium it holds that  v s (t) corresponds to the functions defined in (1).
Now consider deviations. We start by proving that a consumer does not devi-
ate in equilibrium, refusing quid pro quo exchange for help. Recall that, according 
to the monetary trading strategy, equilibrium deviations do not trigger a switch in 
behavior. However, they alter the tokens’ distribution, possibly only temporarily. To 
find a sufficient condition for the existence of a monetary equilibrium, we consider 
the best-case scenario where the distribution of tokens goes back to equilibrium in 
the second round of play after the defection. This will happen if, in the round after 
the deviation, the deviator meets the same counterpart again. Here, the incentive to 
deviate is the largest for a producer because the system is back in equilibrium two 
rounds after a unilateral deviation occurs.
In round  t ≥ 1 let  β t = 1 if  t < T and  β t = β otherwise. Denote by  v ̃1 (t) the 
payoff in  t to a consumer who moves off equilibrium and defects, by refusing to 
spend money in  t . Using recursive arguments we have
  v ̃1 (t) = d − l +  β t [d +  β t+1 v 1 (t + 2) ] 
 < k +  β t [0 +  β t+1 v 1 (t + 2) ] =  v 1 (t) . 
The inequality holds for any  β t because  k > d + d − l by assumption. To under-
stand the inequality consider the first line. Defecting in  t generates payoff  d − l 
instead of  k , and in  t + 1 the player will be a producer with money, reverting back to 
playing the monetary strategy (unimprovability criterion). Hence, she will refuse to 
sell for another token because she already has one; this is optimal because acquiring 
an additional token costs her  d , and she has already one token to spend. Hence, in 
t + 2 , the player becomes a consumer with money and the distribution of tokens is 
back at equilibrium. In summary, after a unilateral deviation in  t by a  consumer, in 
the best-case scenario the group is back on the equilibrium path in round  t + 2 .
Now we prove that if  β ≥  β ∗ , then a producer in equilibrium would not want 
to deviate in any  t , refusing to help for a token. Denote by  v ̃0 (t) the payoff in  t to a 
VOL. 11 NO. 2 221BIGONI ET AL.: MONETARY TRADE AND THE SCALE OF INTERACTION
producer who defects by refusing to accept money in  t . Using recursive arguments, 
we have
  v ̃0 (t) = d +  β t [d − l +  β t+1 v 0 (t + 2) ] 
 < 0 +  β t [k +  β t+1 v 0 (t + 2) ] =  v 0 (t) . 
The inequality holds for any  β t ≥  β ∗ because  k > d + d − l (if  β t = 1 ); if 
 β t = β , then we need  β ≥  β ∗ . The first line of the inequality shows that defecting 
in  t generates payoff  d instead of  0 . In  t + 1 , the player is a consumer without money; 
she cannot buy help—since everyone adopts the monetary strategy—and earns  d − l . 
In  t + 2 , she is a producer without money and the distribution of tokens is back at 
equilibrium. Hence, after a unilateral deviation in  t by a producer, the group is back 
in equilibrium in round  t + 2 . ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
The payoff matrix in a round is
Outcome:  C  D 
Consumer’s payoff:  0  d 
Producer’s payoff:  g  d − l 
with  d = 6 ,  l = 3 ,  g = 15 in fixed pairs and 18 in large groups. The possible 
group size is  2n , with  n = 1, 6, 12 .
Following the risk dominance concept in Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo 
(2011)—an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in fixed pairs—consider 
uncertainty over two competing strategies: “grim” and “always defect” in Control; 
“monetary trade” and “always defect” in Tokens.
Control Condition: The Grim Strategy Is Not Risk Dominant.—Consider uncer-
tainty over two competing strategies: “grim” ( G ) and “always defect” ( AD ). Initial 
producers select a strategy in round 1 and maintain it for the rest of the super-
game. Initial consumers take no action in round 1, so we set them free to select 
G or  AD in round 2. Given public monitoring, all uncertainty about future play 
is resolved at the end of round 1. If no one (someone) defected, then every pro-
ducer cooperates (defects) in every future round. Hence, the choice of strategy 
G dominates  AD in round 2 (weakly, if someone defects in round 1). The full 
cooperation payoff to a consumer,  v , is larger than the full defection payoff,  v ˆ, 
since
  v ˆ ≔  d − l + βd _
1 −  β 2 
  and  v ≔  g _ 
1 −  β 2 
, 
with  v ˆ < v since by assumption  2d − l < g . Therefore, we say that a strategy is 
risk dominant if it makes an initial producer at least indifferent to choosing the com-
peting strategy.
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Large Groups: There is strategic uncertainty in the first round because an initial 
producer is not sure what strategy the other  n − 1 initial producers will select. Suppose 
that every initial producer believes that in round 1 there is probability  p that  C is the 
outcome in any given pair;  D is the outcome with the complementary probability. The 
probability  p is easily mapped into beliefs about strategy selection: the player believes 
that every other initial producer plays  G with probability  p , and  AD otherwise.
Given public monitoring, all uncertainty about future outcomes is resolved by the 
end of round 1: either  C will be the outcome in every meeting, or  D will be the out-
come in every meeting. The central question is how likely it is that full cooperation 
will emerge. Since the probability  p of outcome  C is independent across meetings, 
the initial strategic uncertainty increases with the group size  2n . Fix an initial pro-
ducer, and suppose he selects  G . The probability that there is full cooperation in 
round 1 is  p n−1 , i.e., the joint probability that  C is selected by all other  n − 1 pro-
ducers. Here, full cooperation occurs forever after. With complementary probability 
1 −  p n−1 there is some defection in round 1, and full defection forever after.
Denote  V G and  V AD the expected payoffs for an initial producer who chooses 
strategy  G and  AD , where
  V AD = d + β v ˆ, 
  V G = 0 +  p n−1 βv +  (1 −  p n−1 ) β v ˆ. 
Consider  V AD : the initial producer defects so all future producers will defect (if 
they chose  G or  AD ). Therefore, in round 2, the initial producer is a consumer with 
payoff  β v ˆ. Consider  V G : the initial producer cooperates but the continuation payoff 
depends on the outcome in all other round 1 meetings. With probability  p n−1 every 
other producer is also a grim player so the continuation payoff is  βv ; otherwise, if 
some initial producer defects, the full defection continuation payoff is  β v ˆ. The key 
observation is that all strategic uncertainty is resolved by the end of round 1. We say 
that  G is risk dominant if
  V G ≥  V AD ⇒  p n−1 β (v −  v ˆ) − d ≥ 0
 ⇒  β 2 d (1 −  p n−1 ) + β p n−1 (g + l − d) − d ≥ 0
 ⇒ β ≥  β ∗∗ (n) 
with
  β ∗∗ (n) ≔  
 p n−1 (d − g − l) +  √ 
_______________________
   p 2 (n−1)  (g + l − d) 2 + 4 d2 (1 −  p n−1 )
     _________________________________________
2d (1 −  p n−1 ) 
 ∈  (0, 1) . 
A special case is  p = 0.5 , which may be motivated by the “principle of insufficient 
reason” for someone who is unsure about which of the 2 strategies other initial pro-
ducers will choose. If so, then  β ∗∗ (6) = 0.976 and  β ∗∗ (12) = 0.99 . Since in the 
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experiment  β ∗∗ > β = 0.75 strategy  AD is risk dominant. In Control, strategic 
uncertainty prevents large groups from attaining the efficient outcome.
Fixed Pairs: The analysis for the case of fixed pairs is an adaptation of the analy-
sis above. The important difference is the absence of strategic uncertainty since there 
is just one player who takes an action in each round (the subject who is a producer 
in that round). In a sense, here the player who is a producer in round 1 gets to select 
the equilibrium and can therefore select the efficient equilibrium by cooperating in 
round 1. The reason is as follows: if the initial producer cooperates in round 1, then 
this reveals that she has selected strategy  G . Therefore, the initial consumer faces 
no strategic uncertainty. In fact, choosing strategy  G is always a best response for 
the player who is a producer in round 2 (even if the initial producer defects, as we 
noted above). Hence, adopting strategy  G is optimal for the initial producer because 
there is no uncertainty over the strategy selected by the counterpart. This is the cen-
tral difference between our helping game and the PD game in fixed pairs—it sim-
plifies coordination on the efficient outcome in fixed pairs. Technically, if  n = 1 , 
then  p n−1 = 1 , and hence  V G ≥  V AD implies  β ≥  β ∗ =  d _______ g + l − d = 0.5 since 
g = 15 in fixed pairs.
Tokens Condition: Monetary Trade Is Risk Dominant.—When tokens are avail-
able we let “Monetary Trade” ( MT ) compete against  AD . The main difference rela-
tive to Control is that initial consumers must also select a strategy, since they have 
one token each and so their action set is nonempty. Note that  MT is a history-inde-
pendent strategy, unlike grim. The main implication is that histories of play in this 
scenario cannot affect future play and that the inefficient full defection outcome can 
arise only if all initial producers select  AD .
It should be clear that since tokens are intrinsically worthless,  MT is risk domi-
nant for initial consumers, no matter the uncertainty over strategy selection by oth-
ers. Offering a token quid pro quo for help can only increase an initial consumer’s 
payoff from  d − l to  g , without lowering her continuation payoff even if everyone 
else selects  AD . It follows that initial strategic uncertainty matters only for initial 
producers, who give up  d to receive an intrinsically worthless token from a con-
sumer. We therefore say that  MT is risk dominant if it leaves the representative initial 
producer at least indifferent to choosing the competing  AD strategy.
Fixed Pairs: The immediate implication is that strategic uncertainty is not an issue 
in fixed pairs. The initial producer can select the efficient equilibrium by choosing 
the  MT strategy, knowing that  MT is risk dominant for the initial consumer. Indeed, 
if both choose  MT , then the efficient equilibrium is attained. Here the initial pro-
ducer earns payoff  
βg
 ____ 
1 −  β 2 
. Instead, if either player chooses  AD , then the inefficient 
equilibrium is attained. Here, the initial producer earns payoff  
d + β (d − l)  ________
1 −  β 2 
 , which 
is lower than the efficient equilibrium payoff if  β ≥  β ∗ =  d ______ 
g + l − d = 0.5 . Since 
β = 0.75 in the experiment, strategic uncertainty is not an issue in fixed pairs and 
monetary trade has no advantage over grim.
224 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS MAY 2019
Large Groups: To maintain comparability with the analysis in the Control condi-
tion, let us consider uncertainty over outcomes in a meeting. The main difference is 
that the outcome in a meeting now involves not only  C or  D but also whether a token 
is transferred from consumer to producer or not, i.e., whether there is “trade” or no 
“trade.” Let an initial producer believe that trade occurs with probability  p in any 
given pair of round 1. In round 1, this probability  p easily maps into beliefs about 
strategy selection. We have already established that  MT is risk dominant for initial 
consumers. Hence, to simplify matters, let us suppose that initial consumers assign 
probability 1 to  MT being selected by those who are consumers in round 1. This 
implies that if an initial producer selects  MT with probability  p , then trade occurs 
with probability  p in her round 1 match.
Hence, if we consider the initial round of play, we have the following.
• Initial consumer (who has 1 token): if she chooses  AD , then her payoff is 
 
d − l + βd
 ________
1 −  β 2 
 . As noted above, choosing  MT is optimal because this gives her at 
least a chance to earn  g > d − l in round 1 and do no worse in future rounds 
than by choosing  AD .
• Initial producer (who has no token): if she chooses  AD , then she will never 
trade so we have the same expression as before, i.e.,
  V AD =  
d + β (d − l) 
  ___________
1 −  β 2 
 . 
 Instead, if she selects  MT , she expects to trade with certainty in round 1, since 
all initial consumers select  MT (given the considerations above). The continua-
tion payoff, however, depends on what strategy was selected by all other initial 
producers. The payoff at the start of the game can be written as
  V MT = 0 +  p n−1  
βg
 _ 
1 −  β 2 
+  (1 −  p n−1 ) β V 1 , 
 where  V 1 denotes the expected payoff if not everyone trades in round 1, which 
we now calculate.
The problem in calculating  V 1 is that, unlike Control, strategic uncertainty in 
Tokens gets resolved in round 1 only if trade occurs in every meeting—an outcome 
that can be publicly observed. In that case, the continuation payoff for an initial 
producer (who also chose  MT ) is  βg _____ 
1 −  β 2 
. However, strategic uncertainty remains if 
not everyone trades in round 1 because the distribution of outcomes is not made 
public. Hence, if full cooperation is not realized in round 1, then we must account 
for uncertainty over outcomes in all future rounds. The probability of trading in such 
future meetings depends on the distribution of tokens, which evolves at random and 
is unobserved by players. To see this, note that if someone does not adopt  MT , then 
tokens will not be exchanged in some pairs so as play progresses some producers 
will have a token, while some consumers will not. Hence, monetary trade may fail to 
occur even in meetings between players who have each selected  MT . Assessing this 
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trading uncertainty is problematic because the distribution of tokens evolves based 
on random meetings. For an initial  p , we can find a long-run probability trading in 
a meeting using a technique similar to the one adopted to calculate off-equilibrium 
payoffs under the monetary strategy in Bigoni, Camera, and Casari (2015). As these 
calculations are lengthy and elaborated for participants, we adopt a more reason-
able, heuristic approach. We simply suppose that if monetary trade does not occur in 
all initial meetings, then an initial producer will naively assign the same probability 
p of trading in any future meeting in which she is either a producer without tokens, 
or a consumer with a token.
Given this heuristic approach, consider a player who initially selected strategy 
MT , when strategic uncertainty was not resolved in round 1. Let  V 0 and  V 1 denote 
the expected utilities at the start of any round after the first, if the player is, respec-
tively, a producer without a token and a consumer with a token. We have
  V 0 = p (0 + β V 1 ) +  (1 − p) [d + β (d − l + β V 0 ) ] , 
  V 1 = p (g + β V 0 ) +  (1 − p) [d − l + β (d + β V 1 ) ] . 
The player expects not to trade with probability  1 − p . As this implies no change 
in her token inventory, the player cannot trade in the next round, either. If she is a 
producer who does not sell, then she will have no token to spend next round as a 
consumer. If she is a consumer who does not buy, then she keeps the token and will 
not need to sell next round. Hence, it takes two rounds to have a new chance to trade.
Rewrite
  V 0 [1 −  (1 − p) β 2 ] = pβ V 1 +  (1 − p) [d + β (d − l) ] , 
  V 1 [1 −  (1 − p) β 2 ] = pg + pβ V 0 +  (1 − p) (d − l + βd) . 
Substituting, we have
  V 1 [
1 −  (1 − p) β 2 −  
 (pβ) 2 
 ___________  




 = pg  +  
βp (1 − p) [d + β (d − l) ] 
  ___________________ 
1 −  (1 − p) β 2 
 +  (1 − p) (d − l + βd) . 
The monetary trade strategy is risk dominant for initial producers if  V MT ≥  V AD . 
Given  p = 0.5 , we have  V MT ≥  V AD for all  β ≥ 0.63 approximately if  n = 6 , 
and  β ≥ 0.64 approximately if  n = 12 . Hence, a (long-run) 50/50 chance to trade 
in a round still supports the efficient equilibrium in the Tokens conditions because it 
makes monetary trade risk dominant. ∎
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